Silent Accomplice
The Untold Story of
France’s Role in Rwandan Genocide
By Andrew Wallis
242pp. I.B. Tauris
In the spring of 1994, while the attention of United States was riveted on the O.J. Simpson
trial and the rest of the world watched in delight as Nelson Mandela ascended
to the presidency of the Republic of South Africa, something much more sinister was
developing in Rwanda,
a country often dubbed the “Switzerland of Africa.” In just 100 days nearly one
million Tutsis were slaughtered in Rwanda. The killing began when the plane of Rwanda’s Hutu president Juvenal Habayarimana –
an ardent admirer of Adolf Hitler, was blown to pieces by a ground to air
missile over the night sky of Kigali
on April 4, 1994. Eerily still, the wreckage of the plane fell on the lawn of his
presidential mansion. Hutu extremists rushed to the scene of the plane crash,
located the president’s body and promptly locked it in a café freezer. The
death of the President triggered Hutu activists to begin a pre-meditated
genocide of the minority Tutsis. In a further intrigue, the dead president’s
wife, Agathe, had been integral in running a secret organization that had
planned the genocide which had been triggered by her husbands’ death.
The seeds of the genocide were present in Rwanda’s short
history since independence in 1962. The country’s history was pockmarked with
periods of intense ethnic violence and killing. The basis for these killings
was an artificial ethnic distinction created by the Belgians dividing Rwandans
into two, nearly indistinguishable, ethnic groups: the Hutus and the Tutsis.
The prevailing logic employed by the Belgians was that such a distinction would
make the country easily divided and thus easily ruled. After independence, the Hutu majority
rebelled against their Tutsi overlords in bouts of frenzied ethnic killing.
Many Tutsi fled to neighboring Uganda.
Oddly, after Rwanda’s
independence in 1962 from the country’s Belgian colonizers, the state became a
French client. The French, as Wallis so
aptly and courageously details, were intent on protecting their francophone
friends. It just so happened that Habayarimana spoke French and was friends
with French President Francois Mitterand. Mitterand viewed Rwanda as a
linguistic and cultural friend of the French state. The Habayarimana government
had a powerful protector.
Habayarimana found common cause with the French in opposing
British and American interests in Africa- particularly since Anglo influence
was especially strong in Uganda.
Uganda,
home to the Tutsi refugees, also became the home base of Rwanda Patriotic Front
(RPF) led by Colonel Paul Kagame. The goal of the RPF was to return the Tutsis
to their homeland and defeat the Habayarimana government that had so bitterly
allowed their lives to be destroyed. The
invasion from Uganda
began in 1990.
One of the strongest contributions of Wallis’ book is to set
the events of the 1994 genocide firmly in the context of the ongoing civil war between
the RPF and the Habayarimana government. Wallis superbly juggles multiple story
lines, behind the scenes diplomacy, domestic observations on life in Rwanda and regional geo-political conditions in
central Africa in order to keep his narrative
moving.
The French rushed to the aid of their client francophone
government- flying in arms, troops, advisors and heavy equipment to defeat the
RPF invasion. Each day at Kigali airport tons of
ammunition were flown in by the French to support their African allies in
resisting the RPF advances. When Habayarimana
was killed, the French panicked as they needed a new government that would be
friendly to their interests and they needed it quickly lest the RPF take over
the whole country. Inside the French embassy, over drinks and fine dining, a
rump interim government was handpicked by the French to run the country. Many
of those present at the embassy that night would later be condemned by a UN
tribunal for their role in perpetrating the genocide. Outside the embassy the
genocide raged on.
As nations moved to cut off Rwanda
from international arms shipments, France took a different tack. They
began covertly flying in arms to shore up their new interim government. French
speaking Rwanda
would not fall to forces of the RPF- Colonel Kagame spoke English not French-
and thus, the French were concerned deeply about losing a “franafrique” ally.
What message would other French speaking African states take away if the French
could not even support their friends?
Instead of bolstering the existing UN forces under the
command of General Romeo Dallaire- the French successfully lobbied UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros Gali and the Security Council for a special French
force to secure the country while the UN dillydallied in their preparations for
deploying a larger force. The French desperately wanted a multinational force
but instead only signed on troops from Chad
and Senegal
to participate in the intervention. According to Wallis, from the moment they
touched down in Rwanda,
the French were more interested in keeping the interim government in power and
the RPF out, than stopping the genocide taking place directly in front of them.
No consideration was given by the French to the fact that their new interim
government was fully participating in the genocide.
Wallis also draws on first person accounts that detailed
French troops participating in the genocide, but here the evidence is much
weaker. Professional historians will
clamor for more evidence on this charge and lay readers will be bored by the
over use of tediously long first person quotations that seem overly anecdotal.
If allegations of direct French participation prove true it may be shocking
but, after all, as President Mitterand famously declared about Rwanda “In
countries like that, genocide is not so important.”
The picture Wallis paints of French interests is especially
tragic. The French had no real strategic interest in Rwanda. Their interest was to
preserve the nation as a French speaking one and ensure that this sphere of
influence for them would not be lost. Ultimately, Kagame’s forces prevailed,
the genocide ended a new Hutu-Tutsi government was formed. This didn’t stop the
French from taking action to try to squash a new government that would be less
French in orientation: they vetoed a $200 million EU aid program for the new war
torn coalition government.
Wallis’ findings won’t be surprising to many readers. Large,
imperial countries often tinker with smaller countries, especially in Africa. Who helped give the Congo Mobutu Sese Sekou? or Uganda
Idi Amin? It surely wasn’t solely the Congolese or the Ugandans.
At this point, in the historical investigation of the Rwandan
genocide, it is unlikely the French establishment will admit to their role in
nurturing a government that allowed for nearly a million people to be hacked up
with machetes and shot down in churches, soccer stadiums and community
centers. The darkest days of 1994 were
surely as dark as any of the twentieth century. Wallis deserves great credit
for taking on such an important yet overlooked subject.